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ABSTRACT
Credit card fraud has seen rampant increase in the past years, as
customers use credit cards and similar financial instruments frequently.
Both online and brick-and-mortar outfits repeatedly fall victim to
cybercriminals who siphon off credit card information in bulk. Despite
the many and creative ways that attackers use to steal and trade credit
card information, the stolen information can rarely be used to withdraw
money directly, due to protection mechanisms such as PINs and
cash advance limits. As such, cybercriminals have had to devise more
advanced monetization schemes to work around the current restrictions.
One monetization scheme that has been steadily gaining traction are
reshipping scams. In such scams, cybercriminals purchase high-value
or highly-demanded products from online merchants using stolen
payment instruments, and then ship the items to a credulous citizen.
This person, who has been recruited by the scammer under the guise of
“work-from-home” opportunities, then forwards the received products
to the cybercriminals, most of whom are located overseas. Once the
goods reach the cybercriminals, they are then resold on the black
market for an illicit profit. Due to the intricacies of this kind of scam,
it is exceedingly difficult to trace, stop, and return shipments, which is
why reshipping scams have become a common means for miscreants
to turn stolen credit cards into cash.
In this paper, we report on the first large-scale analysis of reshipping
scams, based on information that we obtained from multiple reshipping
scam websites. We provide insights into the underground economy
behind reshipping scams, such as the relationships among the various
actors involved, the market size of this kind of scam, and the associated
operational churn. We find that there exist prolific reshipping scam
operations, with one having shipped nearly 6,000 packages in just
9 months of operation, exceeding 7.3 million US dollars in yearly
revenue, contributing to an overall reshipping scam revenue of an
estimated 1.8 billion US dollars per year. Finally, we propose possible
approaches to intervene and disrupt reshipping scam services.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.4.1 [Public Policy Issues]: Abuse and crime involving comput-
ers; K.4.4 [Electronic Commerce]: Payment schemes, Security; J.4
[Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Economics.
Keywords
Security; Measurement; Underground Economy; Monetization.
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1 Introduction
Due to their convenience, online banking and electronic commerce
have grown significantly in the past years. With just a credit card and
Internet access, one can buy a wide variety of goods and have them
shipped to their residence, without the need of an in-person transaction.
At the same time, however, cybercriminals covet users’ financial
account information to profit off of them. Data breaches, phishing, and
fraud continue to rise and affect millions of users each year. In 2012,
the software company Adobe Systems was breached and information
of nearly 152 million customers was stolen [1]. In late 2013, in a
data breach against Target (the second largest discount retailer in the
United States), attackers gained access to the credit card and personal
information of up to 110 million customers [2]. In the very same spirit,
in September 2014, the hardware store Home Depot discovered that
their point-of-sale systems were infected with custom-built malware to
exfiltrate credit card information, resulting in 56 million stolen credit
cards from this incident alone [3]. Next to these high-profile cases,
hundreds of smaller regional companies are breached, what appears
to be, almost monthly.
In addition to online breaches of companies storing financial data,
cybercriminals are now branching into the physical world by targeting
the makers of Point-of-Sale (PoS) terminals and infecting them with
malware, leading to the exfiltration of credit card data each time a cus-
tomer swipes his credit card. For instance, in April 2015, Harbortouch,
a PoS manufacturer, was attacked by cybercriminals who planted mal-
ware on their terminals which were then distributed to more than 4,200
businesses [4]. Finally, information stealing botnets and malware,
such as Zeus or Torpig, remain important tools in the cybercriminal’s
arsenal to steal credit card information and account credentials [5].
Despite the criminals’ seemingly inexhaustible stream of compro-
mised credit card information, information theft is usually just the
first stepping stone of a long series of transactions in the underground
economy. More specifically, monetization of obtained credit card in-
formation is a difficult challenge that the cybercriminals face. Directly
withdrawing money using stolen credit cards is usually limited to small
amounts (the cash advance limit) and also bears the risk of exposing the
cybercriminals’ true identities and locations to law enforcement, credit
card companies, and banks. Since criminals want to maximize their
profit and avoid prosecution, they had to devise more elaborate mon-
etization schemes. One class of particularly successful monetization
schemes are so-called reshipping scams.
In a reshipping scam, the criminals purchase high-value products
with stolen credit cards and recruit willing and unsuspecting people
(reshipping mules) to receive and forward the packages on behalf of
the criminals. Once the fraudsters receive the products, they then
sell them on the black market for cash and thus profit at the cost of
consumers, merchants, banks, and insurance companies. In the past
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years, these reshipping scams have become one of the main approaches
for attackers to monetize stolen credit cards.
Reshipping scams offer a variety of advantages to cybercriminals.
First, domestic reshipping mules allow the criminals to sneak mer-
chandise to countries that are not legitimate shipping destinations for
a given product. Second, as the unwitting mules serve as relaying
intermediaries who cloak the criminals’ true identities, these schemes
act as an additional level of indirection and obfuscate traces that the
criminals might have left behind otherwise. Besides the advantages
for criminals, reshipping scams can result in dire consequences for the
mules. As an accomplice to fraud, the mules often end up with financial
loss, sometimes suffer personal harm (PTSD, depression), and even
enter the crosshair of both local and federal law enforcement [6, 7].
Disrupting the reshipping chains of these scams has the potential to
cripple the underground economy by affecting a major income stream
of cybercriminals. In this paper, we investigate the cornerstones of
reshipping scams and identify vantage points to cause such disrup-
tion. Additionally, we present the first in-depth, large-scale study of
reshipping scam operations. To characterize the operational logistics
of reshipping scams and the relationships between the key actors, we
analyze detailed log files from seven reshipping scams.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We present the first in-depth, large-scale analysis of the operational
logistics behind reshipping scams, based on log data collected from
seven reshipping scams.
• We identify the key components in reshipping scams and provide
insights about their operations, including volume of packages, esti-
mated revenue, volume and churn of mules, and targeted merchants.
• We identify bottlenecks in the analyzed reshipping scams and
propose intervention techniques that can be applied to attack and
disrupt the reshipping chain. Such interference can reduce the
criminals’ profit, disincentivize reshipping scams as a monetization
technique, and, in turn, prevent further unsuspecting users from
falling victim to these scams.
2 Reshipping Scams
In this section, we first introduce the background and terminology
used in reshipping scams, and then provide a detailed description of
how criminals operate and manage such operations.
2.1 Terminology
In the reshipping scam ecosystem, criminals take on different roles
depending on their involvement. Similarly, multiple victims are af-
fected every time a single package is bought and shipped. We introduce
the terminology (slang) used by the underground players and we define
the individual roles of the entities involved in the scam.
Operator. The operator of a reshipping scam sets up and manages
the reshipping scam’s website, which is the central component of
the entire operation, tying the various actors together. The website
is typically well-designed and resembles sites of legitimate package
handling and inventory companies to trick the mules into believing
that the scam is indeed a legitimate operation. The responsibilities
of the operator, however, do not end here: on a regular basis, he
has to recruit mules who are willing to ship packages on behalf of
a third party (i.e., the stuffers, see below). To this end, the operators
resort to social engineering and promise the mules a commission or
even a monthly salary for their work. Later on in the scam, once the
operator recruited an initial set of mules, he “rents” out the recruited
mules to other criminals who buy goods with stolen credit cards
and pay the operator for what is effectively reshipping as a service.
Stuffer. The cybercriminals who rent mules from the reshipping scam
sites’ operators to move merchandise are referred to as stuffers.
They purchase high-value products with stolen credit cards from
merchants and have the merchants ship the items to the mules’
addresses. Once the mules receive the packages, the stuffers
provide them with prepaid shipping labels that the mules will use
to ship the packages to the stuffers themselves. After they received
the packages relayed by the mules, the stuffers sell the products
on the black market (usually for cash) to make an illicit profit.
Drop. In underground forums, criminals refer to reshipping mules
also as drops, a term derived from requests for mules which are
often titled “drops for stuff.” Most drops are people who are looking
for a part-time or work-from-home job, but who are then deceived
by the scam operators who pose as legitimate shipping compa-
nies [8]. Drops are the main labor force of the scam: their job is to
receive packages for the stuffers, verify, photograph, repackage the
contents, attach new shipping labels, and ship the packages to the
stuffer (usually located in foreign countries). While they are often
promised a commission per package or sometimes even a monthly
salary by the scam operator, we discovered that drops are usually
not paid, and, instead, they are abandoned by the operators after a
short time (see Section 5.3). In this paper, we use the terms “drops”
and “mules” interchangeably.
Cardholder. Next, there are cardholders, which is the term that the
scam operators and stuffers use to refer to the owners of the stolen
credit cards. Cardholders are one of the many groups of victims of
the scam (alongside merchants, banks, insurers, and drops), because
their credit cards are being used fraudulently by the criminals.
Merchant. Lastly, merchants are legitimate businesses, such as Veri-
zon, Apple, or Amazon, who sell goods to the stuffers, not knowing
that the credit card used to purchase the goods has been compro-
mised. If they fail to identify the credit card as stolen in a timely
manner, they ship the merchandise to the drop, and, in turn, often
incur a significant loss through this scam. The loss is due to being
robbed of the items, having paid for shipping, and having to return
the funds to the cardholder (chargeback).
In the remainder of this paper, we adopt these terms to provide a
holistic view of the underground economy of reshipping scams. In the
following section, we describe in more detail how the different entities
interact with each other and how the criminals operate the scam to
realize an illicit profit by abusing and exploiting the cardholders, drops,
and merchants.
2.2 Anatomy of a Scam Operation
All reshipping scams that we studied in this paper operate in the
same way: reshipping as a service. A paid service that the stuffers
subscribe to and pay for “on demand.” The operators are paid for
providing access to regularly-changing drops and charge a flat fee per
shipment, or a percentage fee based on the value of the items shipped.
Figure 1 provides a slightly simplified view on how such a reshipping
scam operates, and how the different entities interact with each other.
First, the operator posts enticing but fake high-paying job advertise-
ments, for work-at-home or part-time positions to various job portals,
such as Craigslist (omitted from the figure). To apply for the job, appli-
cants have to upload sensitive and personally-identifiable information,
such as copies of their passport, their driver’s license, or employment
records, to the scammer’s website (Ê). Unknowingly, the applicant
fell victim to the scam, even if they do not ship a single item. That is,
besides becoming “drops for stuff,” the victims provide sufficient in-
formation to become easy targets for identity theft where the scammers
have access to all the necessary information to open bank accounts or
credit cards in the victims’ names. Once the scammers review the sub-
mitted application and documents, the applicant will be added to the list
of drops. Note that drops are not necessarily made available to stuffers
immediately. Instead, the operators might keep them unavailable in the
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Figure 1: Operational steps of a standard reshipping scam. First, a drop applies for part-time job as a reshipper on a reshipping scam website
(Ê). Next, a stuffer obtains stolen credit cards (Ë), e.g., through a data breach at a credit card processor or by buying them through an underground
forum. To monetize these stolen credit cards, the stuffer signs up with the reshipping scam site to get access to drops (Ì). The stuffer then purchases
goods online, e.g., a computer, (Í), which the merchant ships to the drop (Î). The stuffer then provides a shipping label to the drop through
the reshipping scam site (Ï) that the drop uses to ship the goods to the stuffer (Ð).
beginning to i) ensure a constant stream of drops later on, ii) to provide
backup and exclusive drops for a premium, and iii) to strengthen their
own reputation by advertising the size and provisions of their service.
Once the operators have recruited an initial set of drops to start their
operation, they advertise their services on various underground forums.
In the next step, a stuffer gains access to credit card information,
possibly by breaching a credit card processor directly, or by buying the
information on an underground forum (Ë) [9]. For the purpose of this
scam, it does not matter how the stuffer gains access to stolen credit
cards. Without loss of generality and to simplify this example and Fig-
ure 1, we assume that the breach happens after the reshipping scam web-
site has been created. To monetize the stolen credit card information the
stuffer then subscribes to a reshipping scam site (Ì). Stuffers can find
such sites by a variety of means, such as advertisements of an operator
or by actively posting requests for “drops for stuff” to an underground
forum. Once a stuffer has subscribed to the reshipping service, he uses
the stolen credit cards to purchase high-value or highly-demanded
products (e.g., computers, cameras, lenses, or Apple products) from
legitimate online retailers, such as Verizon, Apple, or Amazon. Instead
of having the items shipped directly to himself, the stuffer requests
a drop through the reshipping scam site and uses the drop’s address
as the delivery address for the package. However, instead of using
the drop’s name as the recipient, the stuffer provides the cardholder’s
name as the addressee. This serves the purpose of circumventing fraud
detection systems employed at the cardholder’s credit card issuer (Í).
The stuffer then adds the order to the reshipping scam site, associates
it with the drop, and informs the mule that a package will be arriving,
addressed to the cardholder of the credit card used to buy the goods.
Next, the merchant will ship the goods to the drop (Î). Upon arrival
of the package, the mule is instructed to open it and repackage it. For
some reshipping scam sites, the drop must also scan or take pictures
of the invoice (Figure 2(a)) and of the goods that he has received for
verification. The main reason this step is enforced by some operators
is because they take a percentage commission based on the value of
the item that the stuffer shipped through their service (see Section 5.1).
Subsequently, the stuffer or operator, depending on how the site is
operated, provides a prepaid shipping label to the drop (see Figure 2(b))
on which the sender field has a phony name and a bogus, but existing,
address in the same city the drop resides in (Ï). In our data, the desti-
nation address is with overwhelming majority in Moscow, Russia (see
Section 5.4.3). Furthermore, we observe that the value disclosed on
the customs form is merely a fraction of the actual value of the goods
(circled red in Figure 2(b)). This allows stuffers to evade customs duty
and import taxes. The drop then uses this prepaid label to ship the
repackaged goods to the stuffer (Ð).
Finally, the stuffer pays the scam operators, receives the packages,
and resells the goods to realize their profit. For instance, in one case
(see Figure 2), the stuffer bought a PlayStation 4 (with a stolen credit
card) valued at 399 US dollars, which he can resell easily for 300 US
dollars or more, resulting in a net profit for him of at least 100 US
dollars (depending on the cost of the prepaid label and the cost of using
the reshipping site; see Section 5.1).
The drop remains active for about 30 days from the day of the first
received package (see Section 5.3). Just as the drop should receive
his first paycheck, the operator of the reshipping scam site suddenly
ceases all communication with the drop and never makes the promised
payment. Since the only communication channel between drop and
operator was a messaging system that is tightly integrated into the
reshipping website, all communication is cut by simply removing the
drop’s account. Eventually the drop realizes that he was scammed. In
the worst case, the drop himself will be the victim of identity theft (since
he uploaded identification documents during the application process)
and perhaps even the subject of an investigation by local or federal law
enforcement, because of his involvement in credit card fraud.
3 Data Description
We have collaborated closely with the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI) and the United States Postal Investigation Service (USPIS)
(a) Invoice of a Sony PlayStation 4 video game console that a stuffer
purchased at Walmart and shipped through a drop.
(b) Prepaid reshipping label that the stuffer provided to the drop to
ship the video game console to Moscow, Russia. Note that the customs
declaration form states that it is a used game console and valued at 90
US dollars, while the original invoice states 399 US dollars.
Figure 2: Example invoice and reshipment prepaid shipping
label from a purchase by a stuffer for which he utilized a reship-
ping scam site in our dataset (sensitive information masked).
over the course of this research effort. During this time we obtained a
comprehensive and detailed dataset on seven reshipping scam websites
and their operations, spanning from 2010 to 2015. We summarize the
high-level statistics of our dataset in Table 1. While some reshipping
scam websites have been taken down (SHIPPING-E, SHIPPING-F,
and SHIPPING-G), others remain active at the time of submission
and are of investigative interest to federal law enforcement. To avoid
interference with any potential investigations, we use non-identifiable
names to distinguish them instead of disclosing their actual name.
Furthermore, disclosing the websites’ names does not provide any
additional insight into the scammers’ operations. In the remainder of
this paper, we therefore use the non-identifiable names exclusively. For
each reshipping scam that we investigate, we have some or all of the
following information, which we analyze in more detail in Section 5:
1) Time Period. The period indicates the time frame for each scam
operation in our dataset. The longest running reshipping scam
that we observed is SHIPPING-E, which was active for at least 12
months.
2) Reshipping Logs. The reshipping logs contain detailed informa-
tion from the reshipping scam sites’ databases, including: times-
tamps, corresponding stuffers, exploited cardholders, assigned
drops, tracking numbers for the shipments by the merchants to the
drops, and tracking numbers for the reshipped packages destined
for the stuffer. The largest reshipping scam that we observed,
SHIPPING-C, records 5,996 packages delivered within 9 months,
i.e., over 20 packages per day have been shipped through it. Table 2
shows the breakdown of the recorded packages compared to other
core elements of the reshipping logs, e.g., how many cardholders
have been exploited, how many drops have been abused, and how
many stuffers have profited in this specific operation. In the case of
SHIPPING-C, each stuffer received 55.5 packages on average (i.e.,
used the reshipping service 55.5 times), 4,208 different cardholders
were exploited, and each drop received nearly seven packages on
average.
3) Prepaid Labels. Prepaid labels are the shipping labels that scam-
mers purchase, and that are provided to the drops to ship the
packages to the stuffer. All prepaid labels are PDF files, and most
name the stuffer as the recipient, and provide a bogus sender ad-
dress and information about the package’s contents. While some
information on the label is bogus (e.g., the sender address and the
contents’ value), the detailed description of the contents is com-
monly somewhat accurate. For instance, a package might contain
a video game console, but instead of being used, it is actually brand
new and significantly more valuable (see Figure 2(b)). We use
optical character recognition (OCR) to automatically extract such
information from the labels (PDF files) (see Section 5).
4) Drop Details. The drop details contain personally-identifiable
information of drops, such as their home addresses, scans of their
passports, drivers’ licenses, prior employment records, and some-
times even their social security numbers. The scammers require
the drops to submit this information to apply for the job in the first
place. Providing this information to the scam operators bears an
additional and significant risk for the drops: the operators can and
are disclosing the information to stuffers if, for example, a drop
is unreliable and does not reship some goods to the stuffers (see
Section 5.1.1). This might be because the drop decided to keep the
item or if the drop is caught by law enforcement before being able
to ship the item. Disclosing this information to the stuffers is part of
the agreement that the stuffer and the operator enter, and it provides
the stuffer with a basic level of security because it allows them to
identify the mules or abuse their information for other frauds, such
as opening credit cards or bank accounts in their name.
5) Messages. The reshipping operations we studied feature an inte-
grated messaging system. This messaging system is used by the
scam operators to provide support to the stuffers and to the drops
alike. For instance, in some cases providing the prepaid label to
the drop (for the shipment to the stuffer) is part of the operator’s
overall service. In this case, the stuffer would request labels for
shipments through the messaging system. In other cases, it is used
to arrange payment by the stuffer to the operator. Similarly, a drop
would report problems when trying to drop off a package at the
postal office through the messaging system to the operator. Note
that the integrated messaging system is the only communication
channel that mules can use to contact the operator. Stuffers, how-
ever, are often provided with the information necessary to contact
the operator through ICQ or Jabber for additional, time-sensitive
support.
6) Rules. Finally, for some reshipping scam websites we have detailed
information about operational policies and news updates that were
posted on the websites. Additionally, this information contains the
agreement that the stuffers enter into when using the service.
Note that the messages and rules provide anecdotal evidence that cor-
roborates our hypotheses about the inner workings of reshipping scams.
To provide an in-depth analysis of the operational logistics of re-
shipping scams, we combine and link the separate datasets within
a reshipping service. This allows us to gain novel insights on how
the scam works in detail, and how the different parties interact with
Site Time Period Reshipping Logs Prepaid Labels Drop Details Messages Rules
SHIPPING-A 11 months in 2014 and 2015 1,960 846 88 1,889 3
SHIPPING-B 9 months in 2013 and 2014 1,493 — 43 255 3
SHIPPING-C 9 months in 2014 and 2015 5,996 — 106 — —
SHIPPING-D 4 months in 2014 — 613 — — —
SHIPPING-E 12 months in 2010 and 2011 — 835 — 11,596 —
SHIPPING-F 2 months in 2011 991 — — — —
SHIPPING-G 1 month in 2013 — — 54 — 3
Table 1: Summary of the site-specific data sets. Reshipping logs include detailed information about the package contents, their values, the
corresponding stuffers, the receiving drops, tracking numbers, and timestamps. Prepaid labels contain information about the stuffers’ locations,
the cost of the labels, and the values of the items. Drop details include sensitive and personally-identifiable information, such as passports, drivers’
licenses, or addresses. Messages contain interactions between stuffers and the website operators and messages between drops and the website
operators. Rules contain information for stuffers on price changes for shipments, how and through what channels prepaid labels must be bought,
information on refunds for lost shipments, or announcements that drops are unreliable.
Site Time Period Packages Cardholders Drops Stuffers
SHIPPING-A 11 months in 2014 and 2015 1,960 1,184 (1.7:1) 82 (—)† 49 (40.0:1)
SHIPPING-B 9 months in 2013 and 2014 1,493 963 (1.6:1) 8 (—)† 71 (21.0:1)
SHIPPING-C 9 months in 2014 and 2015 5,996 4,208 (1.4:1) 881 (6.8:1) 108 (55.5:1)
SHIPPING-F 2 months in 2011 991 722 (1.4:1) 53 (18.7:1) 41 (24.2:1)
Table 2: Statistics on reshipping logs. The ratio in the parentheses indicates the ratio of the package counts to the counts of other elements.
† Note that 75.41% packages of SHIPPING-A and 93.10% packages of SHIPPING-B have had no explicit assignment to any drop, possibly because
the drop has been removed from the database. We investigate the churn of drop recruitment in detail in Section 5.3.
each other. For instance, if a reshipping log entry of SHIPPING-A
indicates that stuffer X purchased goods with the stolen credit card of
cardholder Y and assigned the reshipping task to drop Z, then we know
that the credit card of victim Y was stolen and fraudulently charged,
and that the merchant shipped a package to Z, whose address will
appear in the drop details. From the associated prepaid label, we can
then further identify the address and possibly the name of the stuffer.
Continuing down this path, we can investigate the messages exchanged
between Z and the scam operator, which might reveal that Z received
specific reshipping instructions, e.g., to bundle two packages into one.
Similarly, the interactions between the stuffer X and the scam operator
can provide insightful information about the illegal business practices
and the relationship between stuffers and operators. Due to the breadth
and variety of the information available to us, we are able to provide
highly-detailed insights into the operation of reshipping scams.
In addition to the site-specific data that we have analyzed, USPIS
and the FBI have shared additional high-level information with us,
including information on drops’ addresses, label purchase services,
and data on the scale of suspicious packages being shipped by drops.
The provided information allowed us to expand our observations to
a larger scale and to estimate the financial loss of victims (merchants,
cardholders, and drops) of reshipping scams.
4 Ethics
The data that we analyze in this paper provokes various questions in
respect to the ethical handling of it. First and foremost, the work that we
present in this paper was conducted in full compliance with the approval
of our institutional review board (IRB), as well as in close collaboration
with federal law enforcement (FBI and USPIS). Furthermore, contrary
to prior work, we are not trading or interacting with the operators of the
scam, stuffers, or any middlemen. We are neither renting drops from the
operator nor are we buying goods from the stuffers that they purchased
with stolen credit cards. Over the course of this paper, we have not
interacted with the victims or the scammers. Instead, we analyze
information from their databases and operational logs exclusively.
However, because our data contains some personally-identifiable
information (see Section 3), we must handle it properly and with
extreme care. All our data is encrypted at rest (on the disk) as well as
in motion (when transferred). Moreover, we use fictitious one-way
pseudonyms to retain accountability but prevent disclosure of any
personal information. Similarly, we abstracted addresses at a city
level, which anonymizes the exact location and auxiliary information
such as neighborhoods (e.g., high-income or low-income). Lastly, our
work primarily presents aggregate statistics and results on the entire
reshipping scam, and we are not reporting information on the victims
(cardholders and drops) themselves.
Finally, the goal of this research is twofold. Primarily, we aim to
provide a detailed exploration of the inner workings of reshipping
scams to the research community. At the same time, this research is
intended to provide law enforcement and policy makers with the most
effective steps to disrupt this criminal activity and prevent more victims
from being hurt by reshipping scams. We are certain that the benefits to
the general public of our study strongly exceed any knowledge that the
criminals might obtain from the high-level details that we present in
our paper. We have worked closely with the FBI and USPIS in respect
to not disclosing any information indicative of individual sites that
might alert the operators.
5 Measurement and Analysis
In this section, we provide a detailed analysis of reshipping scams,
calculate statistics on different aspects of them, and provide insights
into the following issues: how do miscreants split the illicit profit,
who are the victims, how much is the financial loss, and what is the
life cycle of a drop. Furthermore, we identify potential bottlenecks
in reshipping scam operations and propose intervention approaches.
5.1 Illicit Business Model
Miscreants use reshipping scams to gain an illicit profit, particularly
to monetize stolen credit cards. The core component of the scam is
the reshipping site, which provides “reshipping as a service” to other
criminals (stuffers). A range of players participate in the scam, provide
various services, and share the illicit income.
5.1.1 Agreement and Profit Split between Criminals
In exchange for renting drops out to stuffers, reshipping scam site
operators charge a commission. The rule pages that we extracted
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Figure 3: Distribution of prepaid label cost. The different reship-
ping scam sites specialize on different goods: SHIPPING-A focuses
on luxury goods, SHIPPING-D targets reshipping of lower-priced
items, and SHIPPING-E specializes on Apple Products. Note that
SHIPPING-A includes prepaid labels to domestic addresses (within
the US) to other reshipping services to further obscure the stuffers’
final destination address. For SHIPPING-A, labels costing less than
about 45 US dollars are almost exclusively domestic labels.
from reshipping sites expose two different business models: taking
a percentage cut of the item’s value, or charging a flat rate fee.
For instance, SHIPPING-A takes a percentage cut. Here, stuffers
must pay a portion of the product’s value to the site operator as the
reshipping fee. Note that SHIPPING-A specializes on premium and
high-value products, and requires a minimum value of any item shipped
through it of 300 US dollars. Specifically, the operator charges up to
50% of the items’ values and he maintains a detailed list of products
that are eligible for reshipment. This list specifies the exact percentage
cuts that the operator takes: e.g., 40–50% cut for Apple MacBooks,
35% for digital cameras and lenses, or 25% for baby strollers.
On the other hand, SHIPPING-B targets lower-priced products (e.g.,
clothing) and simply charges a flat-rate fee of 50 to 70 US dollars per
package.
In both cases, reshipping scam site operators take a considerable
portion of the profit. Stuffers are willing to pay the significant over-
head because the operators play a key role in the scam: without the
reshipping support, the stolen credit cards or accounts are worth little
because they cannot be efficiently monetized.
In addition, reshipping sites provide a certain level of customer
service for successful package delivery. If a drop who is not marked
as problematic embezzles the package, reshipping sites offer free
shipping for the next package or pay up to 15% of the item’s value
as compensation to stuffers (e.g., as compensation for “burning” the
credit card or the already-paid reshipping label). Note that, in case the
authorities identify the drop and intercept the package, the reshipping
sites provide no compensation (“acts of God”). For a premium, stuffers
can rent private drops that no other stuffers will have access to. Such
private drops are presumably more reliable and are shielded from
interference by other stuffers and, in turn, have a reduced risk to be
discovered (hence, lower risk of losing packages).
Besides the actual drops, prepaid shipping labels are another critical
resource. Historically, criminals simply created and used fake labels by
modifying information and barcodes of existing labels. Once shipping
companies started identifying such fraudulent labels, the miscreants
started purchasing real labels but payed for them with stolen credit
cards. Recently, shipping companies have become even more vigilant
and started performing thorough checks on the validity of the credit
cards that are used to purchase labels. This lead to successfully stopped
shipments and discovered drops. Besides the shipping companies,
drops became increasingly suspicious of the legitimacy of the reship-
Product Percentage
Average
Price
Median
Price
Apple Products 57.05% $789 $750
iPhones 39.08%
iPads 15.52%
MacBooks 2.45%
Camera Related 19.58% $722 $500
Action Camcorder (GoPro) 14.59%
Digital SLRs 4.57%
Lenses 0.38%
Flashes 0.04%
Computer Related 13.29% $1,030 $1,030
Laptops 8.53%
Processors and Disks 4.19%
Desktops 0.57%
Other Electronics 5.40% $611 $550
Fashion and Apparel 1.35% $1,408 $1,000
Nutrition 0.36% $1,020 $1,050
Miscellaneous 2.97% $909 $689
Table 3: Product categories and prices for SHIPPING-C.
ping company when the post office clerks asked where they received
the label from. In response, reshipping scams prohibited the use of
stolen credit cards to purchase labels and are actively imposing fines of
up to 1,000 US dollars on the stuffer that violate this rule. Furthermore,
such violators are threatened with public exposure if a post office
declines a package because of a defective label (e.g., if the drop reports
the incident to the operator). As a result, criminals moved toward
“white label” shipping services [10], where the payment is made via
a legitimate account (e.g., a bank account that was opened in the name
of a drop with his personally identifiable information, see Section 3)
or through companies. These labels are often considerably cheaper
than those one would buy directly from a shipping company (due to
large volume discounts). For example, criminals pay only 51.74 US
dollars for a USPS Priority Mail Express label for a five-pound package
to Russia, while the regular label costs 72.55 US dollars. Figure 3
provides more detail on the distribution of the costs of the prepaid
shipping labels that the scammers use. In all cases, the majority of the
labels costs less than 100 US dollars. Furthermore, the distribution of
the label cost appears to be correlated with the value of items the scam
operation targets: SHIPPING-A targets luxury goods and increases the
slowest, with about 67% of all package labels costing 100 US dollars
or less; SHIPPING-E focuses on Apple products, generally high-value,
with nearly 90% of all prepaid labels costing 100 US dollars or less;
on the other hand, SHIPPING-D specializes on lower-price items, and
almost all of its labels (99%) cost 100 US dollars or less (all labels cost
less than 125 US dollars). Note that the stuffers of SHIPPING-A reship
to other reshipping services within the US (in Claymont, Delaware
and Dover, Delaware; see Table 6), possibly to obscure their traces
further. These domestic labels account for almost all labels costing
less than 45 US dollars.2
Upon arrival of the packages at their destination, criminals sell the
goods on the black market, sometimes directly to wholesale retailers,
who introduce the items into the regular and seemingly-legitimate deliv-
ery chain. Generally, in those foreign countries, the products can be sold
for a 30-50% markup on top of the original purchase price, which allows
scammers to increase their illicit income further. For instance, an Apple
MacBook selling for 1,000 US dollars in the US, sells for 1,400 US dol-
lars in Russia because the goods are often priced higher (custom duty,
taxes, and other fees), or are difficult to acquire (sanctions, embargoes).
2Removing domestic labels from the cumulative percentage shifts
SHIPPING-A’s line to right, below SHIPPING-E.
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Figure 4: Proportion statistics of package content categories
per reshipping scam. SHIPPING-A specializes on luxury-goods and
charges a percentage cut per shipment, SHIPPING-B explicitly targets
low-priced items and charges a flat fee per package, SHIPPING-C
focuses on high-value electronics and charges a percentage cut,
SHIPPING-F targets low to medium priced items.
5.1.2 Product Categories and Targeted Merchants
Reshipping scams tend to ship high-value and highly-demanded
products to foreign countries, which can, in turn, yield a higher profit
than lower-priced items. In the following, we examine the core prod-
ucts that cybercriminals purchase for these reshipping scams. Our
findings can help retailers to avoid fraud and assist postal services to
identify suspicious packages because they allow to focus attention on
the products that the criminals desire. We group the products into seven
categories (see Table 3): Apple Products (iPhones, iPads, and Mac-
Books), Camera Related (action camcorders, digital SLRs, and lenses),
Computer Related (desktops, laptops, and parts like processors and
disks), Other Electronics (referring to other electronic items besides the
ones listed in the previous three categories, like GPS, or TVs), Fashion
and Apparel (e.g., clothes, watches, and handbags), Nutrition (e.g.,
vitamins and sport supplements), and Miscellaneous (products not
included in the other categories, such as power tools and baby strollers).
Figure 4 illustrates the proportions of the product categories ob-
served for four reshipping scam operations (compare Table 2), whose
logs contain detailed descriptions of the products that the stuffers
purchased. For SHIPPING-C, cybercriminals heavily targeted the
Apple Products and Camera Related categories (see Figure 4(c)) and,
for SHIPPING-B, Fashion and Apparel (see Figure 4(b)). Generally,
electronic products, such as iPhones and cameras, have high unit prices
but are inexpensive to ship because of their limited weight and small
size. Luxury and brand-name fashion and accessories are often in
high-demand in foreign markets and are also less likely to be damaged
in transit.
In the case of SHIPPING-C, our data also includes the purchase
prices of the products that the stuffers shipped. Table 3 shows the
product categories, the average prices, and the median prices of the
products for each category. Scammers mainly target expensive prod-
Rank Store (.com) Pct. Rank Store (.com) Pct.
1 shop 26.23% 11 t-mobile 1.60%
2 verizon 14.86% 12 amazon 1.35%
3 att 13.20% 13 groupon 1.27%
4 gopro 6.18% 14 abt 0.90%
5 newegg 4.52% 15 hp 0.88%
6 sprint 3.78% 16 lenovo 0.75%
7 ebay 3.60% 17 academy 0.70%
8 apple 3.47% 18 tigerdirect 0.67%
9 bestbuy 2.78% 19 macmall 0.48%
10 walmart 1.98% 20 staples 0.43%
Table 4: Online stores targeted by stuffers who use SHIPPING-C.
Top 20 of the online stores targeted by stuffers who use SHIPPING-C
for reshipping, accounting for 89.63% of all packages. Note that
shop.com works as a proxy: it handles credit card processing for
merchants (e.g., Best Buy), who ship the item once the order was
processed by shop.com.
ucts that are worth hundreds or even thousands of dollars. Based on
the recorded unit prices, we later investigate the financial loss caused
by reshipping scams in Section 5.2.2.
Interestingly, the log data from SHIPPING-C also specifies from
which online store the items were purchased. Cybercriminals target a
variety of online stores, and the stuffers using SHIPPING-C for reship-
ping defrauded 233 unique online stores alone. Table 4 lists the top
20 websites with the most purchases, which account for 89.63% of the
packages. The store site with most illicit purchases, shop.com, is a
large shopping comparison and marketing company, where customers
can shop from many retailers and manufactures. shop.com, however,
only sells products through their OneCart program, which works sim-
ilar to Amazon Marketplace. That is, shop.com handles payment
processing and informs the merchant to ship the product, who, in turn,
ships the goods. Multiple reasons might exist why criminals prefer
to use shop.com by such a large margin: i) fraudulent use of credit
cards might not be detected as quickly as by the merchants themselves,
or ii) the delay to notify the merchant when shop.com receives a
chargeback or is alerted about a fraudulent credit card might be long
enough for the items to have arrived at the drop and might have been
already reshipped. This increases the response time of the merchants
and payment processor which is advantageous for the cybercriminals.
5.1.3 Allocation of Drops to Stuffers
Reshipping scam operators act as service providers, renting their
drops out to stuffers. As such, they have control of how many drops the
stuffers can use at the same time. Subsequently, stuffers choose their
drops from the candidate pool and assign reshipping tasks to them.
Our data contains a snapshot of an assignment between 47 drops and
38 stuffers from SHIPPING-A. In Figure 6, the white circles on the
bottom are drops, and the black circles are stuffers. A black dot on
the grids means that the corresponding drop reships packages for the
corresponding stuffer. Drops are ordered from left to right in the number
of the associated stuffers. Stuffers are ordered from bottom to top in
the number of the allocated drops. The red cross indicates the average
number of drops and stuffers respectively. For instance, drops on the
right side of the vertical red line have more stuffer assignments than
the average drop. Note that the assignment is not exclusive, a drop can
forward packages for multiple stuffers, and a stuffer can have multiple
drops to distribute the reshipping tasks to. The eight left most drops
(gray shade), however, are exclusive drops and serve only one stuffer.
5.2 Negative Impact and Financial Loss
Although it might appear that the prey of reshipping scams are
fundamentally the users whose financial and personally-identifiable
information is stolen (like credit cards and store accounts), there are
several other actors who are negatively affected by the scam. Here-
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Figure 6: Mapping between drops and stuffers for SHIPPING-A.
The white circles on the bottom indicate drops, and the black circles on
the left represent stuffers. The elements on one dimension is ordered
by the numbers of the associated elements on the other dimension
(left to right and bottom to top). The red lines in the middle indicate
the averages. The eight left most drops are exclusive (gray shade).
inafter, we identify the victims in reshipping scams, and we quantify
their financial loss.
5.2.1 Victims
First, investigations by federal law enforcement confirmed that the
cardholders in reshipping scams were the victims from data breaches
or information theft. The problem is twofold. On the one hand, credit
cards are generally insured and the cardholder rarely suffers financial
loss. On the other hand, if cybercriminals steal a debit card (which,
in the US, uses the same payment processing techniques as a credit
card, and can often be used interchangeably) then the cardholder is not
necessarily insured and often unable to dispute the transaction, leaving
him alone with the financial loss the criminals incurred. In case of a
compromised credit card, then the loss is distributed over different
parties. First, the cardholder needs to spend time and effort to fight
the fraudulent transaction. Second, the bank needs to issue and send a
new credit card to the cardholder. Third, the merchant has to cover the
loss of the merchandise and an additional chargeback, which can range
up to 100 US dollars. Additionally, due to consumer protection against
credit card fraud, retailers are usually held liable for the illicit purchases
and have to reimburse the cardholder for all incurred charges. At this
point, it is often too late for the retailer to retrieve the merchandise
because it has been shipped out to the drop and might have already been
reshipped. Furthermore, besides the chargeback fee, retailers have
paid (directly or indirectly through the chargeback) for shipping to the
drop. In the case that stolen credit cards are used to buy prepaid cards
(which are then used to buy the actual goods), then the prepaid card
issuer will face financial loss. While most cardholders appeared only
once or twice, others are used for five or more times (see Figure 5(b)),
increasing the damage done and the cybercriminals’ profit before they
need to compromise more credentials.
The unwitting drops are victims too. The miscreants often do not pay
the promised salary or commission and they abuse the drops’ personal
information in other frauds and open bank accounts in the victims’
names (see Section 5.3). While being victims of the scam, the drops
also face the risk of becoming a target in lawsuits for assisting in fraud.
Finally, the destination countries for the goods lose tax income and
customs duty as the packages are not properly declared by the criminals.
5.2.2 Loss Estimate and Damages
Site-Specific Revenue Estimate. First, we investigate the number
of illicit purchases and measure the financial loss incurred by single
reshipping scam operations. The log data from four reshipping scams
(see Table 2) includes the timestamps of purchases and the accumu-
lated indexes of the packages (except for SHIPPING-F, whose index
starts at 1). Figure 7 shows in more detail how the reshipping scams
evolve over time. The x-axis indicates the relative time starting at the
beginning of our observation periods, and the y-axis shows the package
indices. We fit the package counts via least squares linear regression.
Furthermore, when we project the dates back to when the package
index was 0 for site SHIPPING-A and SHIPPING-C, these inferred
dates match the domain registration dates of the sites, which supports
the correctness of our model. The number of packages that are shipped
in a specific time period through each reshipping scam appears to not
increase for SHIPPING-A and SHIPPING-F (linear regression fits all
recordings well). However, for SHIPPING-C, the operation appears
to gain momentum as the rate of shipped packages toward the end of
our dataset significantly outperforms the linear regression. In contrast,
SHIPPING-B, seems to have reached its end of life at slightly over a
total of 2,000 packages.
We use this model to estimate how many illicit purchases are being
made by cybercriminals for a given period. Thus, in a one year pe-
riod we estimate 1,911 packages being shipped through SHIPPING-A,
3,541 through SHIPPING-B, 9,009 through SHIPPING-C, and 6,673
through SHIPPING-F respectively. The annual package number from
a reshipping scam site is typically in the magnitude of 1,000–10,000,
while other highly-productive reshipping operations reportedly man-
age close to 50,000 packages in a single year. Note that, the majority of
stuffers, around 80%–90%, have shipped less than 60 packages during
our observation. However, a small number of stuffers ordered up to
300 packages (see Figure 5(a)).
If we further correlate the product ratios (see Figure 4) and the aver-
age prices of each category (see Table 3) with the estimated number of
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Figure 7: Linear regression of number of package (based on
database index) increase over time. The day (x-axis) is relative to
our first observation.
purchases, then we can estimate the annual illicit revenue of a single re-
shipping scam site to range from 1.8 million US dollars (SHIPPING-A)
to over 7.3 million US dollars (SHIPPING-C). Note that, for simplicity
and to be conservative, we do not include the potential product markup
(see Section 5.1.1) in foreign countries in our revenue calculation.
Overall Financial Loss. In addition to the per-site revenue, we es-
timate the overall financial loss incurred by reshipping mule scams
by estimating the number of cardholder victims and the damage per
cardholder. For an accurate estimate, we first infer the number of card-
holder victims for all reshipping scams by using a mark and recapture
(capture-recapture) approach, which is a technique used to estimate
a population’s size in ecology and epidemiology [11]. Following, we
use the Lincoln index [12]. The idea of a capture-recapture analysis
is to repeatedly sample from the population to estimate its size. First,
we take a sample S1, mark, and then release it back into the population.
We then take a second sample S2 and examine the marked members
of S2, which is the intersection of S1 and S2. We then estimate the
population P = |S1|×|S2||S1∩S2| . For a perfectly accurate capture-recapture
model some assumptions are crucial, e.g., the population is homo-
geneous and closed (i.e., no new entries are allowed). Some of the
assumptions do not necessarily hold for our analysis, however, they
have likely only negligible impact because of the significant time-wise
overlap (see Table 2) and the way that credit card information is stolen
(see Section 1). For example, in our case, new cardholders might be
defrauded and involved in the scam, possibly reducing accuracy of
the estimate slightly. However, we aim to only use the estimate for an
initial approximation of the population size of the abused cardholders.
For our population estimate we consider two fraud cases as referring
to the same credit card or account if the owners’ names are identical
and the purchases from different reshipping scam sites occur close
in time. In our analysis, we use a threshold of one month since it is
very likely that the fraud is detected within one month, either through
automatic means or by verifying the account statement. If the time dif-
ference between two cases exceeds one month, it is likely that separate
cardholder victims have the same name, or that the same victim has had
his replacement credit card compromised once again. We use the two
sites in our data set with most defrauded cardholders: SHIPPING-A
and SHIPPING-C. They overlap for seven months, during which 761
cardholders were defrauded by stuffers using SHIPPING-A and 3,569
were defrauded by stuffers using SHIPPING-C. Three cardholders
appear on both sites during the overlap period. Therefore, the estimated
number of overall cardholders who are victims of reshipping mule
scams per year is 761×3,569
3
× 12
7
≈ 1, 552, 005. Note that, while
these numbers serve as an estimate, the number of stolen credit card
information and potential victims is multiple magnitudes larger and
our estimate is likely on the conservative side (see Section 1).
We calculate the average damage per cardholder based on exact
data from SHIPPING-C’s reshipping logs. Overall, we see a total of
5,505 packages with a legitimate item value (we remove 491 packages
from the data for which the item’s value is not provided or for which
an obviously fake value is given; we only exclude items with item
value less or equal to 1 US dollar). For these 5,505 packages, a total
of 3,926 cardholders were defrauded with the sum of all values being
4,542,104.53 US dollars. In turn, this results in an average damage
per cardholder of 4,542,104.53
3,926
= 1, 156.93 US dollars.
Finally, by multiplying the average loss per cardholder with the es-
timated overall number of cardholders, we can estimate that the overall
reshipping scam revenue is around 1.8 billion US dollars per year.
5.3 Drop Recruitment
Drops are the main labor force in the reshipping scam as they receive
and reship goods for the cybercriminals. In this section, we investigate
the characteristics of drops and the timing patterns when they sign up
and relay packages, and where the drops are located.
5.3.1 Drop Churn / Life Cycle
First, to better understand how and when the criminals utilize the
drops (i.e., to analyze their life cycle), we investigate the signup time
of drops and when they are first associated with packages. Figure 8
shows the life cycles of drops in more detail. The x-axis indicates the
relative days, and the y-axis presents the indices of drops observed
from SHIPPING-A. A red circle indicate an assignment event where
a stuffer assigns a reshipping task to a drop, with the size of the circle
being proportional to the number of packages assigned on any given
date. A black line indicates the idle period between the day when a
drop has successfully signed up at the reshipping scam site and the day
of his first assignment.
A drop receives packages shortly after he has signed up, usually after
a few days. We observe a clear churn pattern in the drops’ life cycles:
Cybercriminals stop using the drops after around 30 days and start to
employ a new batch of drops. The hypothesis is that the reshipping
sites abandon the drops before the first expected paycheck dates. We
examined the message exchanges between the reshipping site operators
and the drops to verify this hypothesis. As a concrete example, on day
two after the drop signed up, the drop sent an email to confirm when he
will receive his first paycheck (“I know the pay is only once a month so
when will I receive my first check!? ”). In the weeks after, the drop and
the site operator had frequent contact about issues regarding packages
and labels. On day 30, the drop asked again: “Exactly what time will
my check be deposited into my account Monday!?”, to which the site
operator replied that he would receive it: “by the end of Monday”. The
drop then continued to reship packages. On day 35, the drop inquired
again about his payment date (“What time will I be paid!?”). The site
operator then instructed the drop to ship all packages to receive the
check, likely to make sure all merchandise has been shipped. On day
36, we observe that the drop asked again about his payment (“When
will my check be deposited!?”), to which the operator never replied.
We have found multiple other instances in which drops complained
about not receiving compensation and none of the messages in our
data set showed any proof that drops successfully received payments.
Our findings strongly suggest that the cybercriminals intentionally
make no payment to the drops, which results in fast drop turnover
and requires regular recruitment. Without actually paying mules, the
scammers save money while being able to advertise high salaries
and compensation, which, in turn, attracts more drops. For example,
SHIPPING-A promised drops a monthly salary of 2,500 US dollars.
Overall, the criminals utilize an average drop to reship between
five (SHIPPING-A) and fifteen (SHIPPING-F) packages, with some
outliers reshipping over 50 packages during their 30-day lifetime
(SHIPPING-F). Figure 5(c) shows the distribution of the counts of pack-
ages delivered to the drops. Interestingly, different sites exhibit differ-
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Figure 8: Life cycle of drops for SHIPPING-A. The red circles represent assigned package counts. The black horizontal lines indicate the periods
from drop signups to the first packages.
Figure 9: Locations of the drops.
ent trends: SHIPPING-C replaces drops significantly more quickly than
SHIPPING-F, while both have about the same number of packages re-
shipped in the same time frame (see Figure 7). For SHIPPING-B, drops
ship at least four packages and half of them ship 14 packages or more.
5.3.2 Geography
Figure 9 shows the distribution of city-level addresses of drops.
In the US, five states, California, Florida, Texas, Georgia, and New
York, account for 44.33% of the drops. However, only in one of those
states, namely Georgia, the likelihood to encounter a mule at random
among the state population exceeds 0.01%. To measure the likelihood
that a resident of a state is recruited as a mule, henceforth called drop
likelihood, we divide the number of drops in a state (observed in our
data) by the entire population of that state [13]. We summarize our
findings in Table 5, which shows the rankings of the top 10 states in
terms of drop likelihood (in decreasing order).
Finally, we compare the annual unemployment rates of these states
in 2014 [14] to the federal average. The last column in Table 5 lists the
differences of the state unemployment rates compared to the federal
unemployment rate, wheres indicates a higher unemployment rate
in that state and5 indicates a lower rate. Most states, except Virginia
(rank 10), have unemployment rates close to or above the US average
rate, which could indicate that cybercriminals target unemployed or
underemployed groups to recruit mules.
5.4 Intervention Analysis
All parties who are actively losing money through shipping scams
(see Section 5.2) have a strong incentive to prevent these fraudulent
transactions. In this spirit, many merchants stopped shipping to high-
risk countries, such as Russia, and have been shipping goods exclu-
Rank State
Drop
likelihood
Difference to US 2014
Annual Unemployment Rate
1 Georgia 0.01099% s + 1.0%
2 Nevada 0.01011% s + 1.6%
3 Delaware 0.00951% 5 – 0.5%
4 Florida 0.00919% s + 0.1%
5 Maryland 0.00868% 5 – 0.4%
6 North Carolina 0.00710% 5 – 0.1%
7 Mississippi 0.00674% s + 1.6%
8 Arizona 0.00667% s + 0.7%
9 Illinois 0.00608% s + 0.9%
10 Virginia 0.00599% 5 – 1.0%
Table 5: Drop states. States are ordered decreasing in the drop
likelihood (number of drops in a state / population of state) and the dif-
ference of the state unemployment rates to the average unemployment
rate in the US in 2014 (above (s) or below (5) the average).
sively within the US for some time. This, in turn, prompted cybercrimi-
nals to adopt the reshipping mule scheme that we analyze in this paper.
In this section, we outline promising ways in which shipping service
companies can aid in combating this monetization technique and help to
reduce the damage done to the businesses involved, by identifying sus-
picious packages before they leave the country. While we discuss these
measures separately, the individual approaches can be combined to pin-
point high-risk packages, which can be inspected by law enforcement.
A successful identification of a reshipping-scam-originating pack-
age can soften the blow on victim merchants (the merchandise can be
returned), and stop criminals from profiting since they do not receive
the goods that they were planning on selling on the black market. We
argue that the cost of this selective increased screening of suspicious
packages can be covered by the most victimized vendors, since the cost
is likely to be many times smaller than the cost of stolen merchandise.
5.4.1 Access Patterns
One way to detect suspicious packages is by analyzing how, when,
and from where tracking information of possibly-suspicious pack-
ages is accessed at the shipping provider’s or a third-party’s package
tracking website. This information can include data points such as the
browsers’ user-agent of the visitors, their source IP addresses, their
timezones, or their languages. For instance, tracking information for
a package from Walmart to a person living in California will (in most
cases) not be tracked exclusively by someone in Russia. As such, if
a website visitor from a different country is tracking a package more
actively than the actual recipient or sender, then this can be a strong
indicator that the package might be suspicious.
Site Destination
Label
Percentage
SHIPPING-A
Moscow Area, Russia 85.89%
Moscow, Russia 80.66%
Balashiha, Russia 3.65%
Sverdlovskiy, Russia 0.97%
Gorodok, Russia 0.61%
Claymont, DE, US 6.08%
Dover, DE, US 2.43%
Other Cities 5.60%
SHIPPING-D
Moscow Area, Russia 89.07%
Zheleznodorozhnyj, Russia 63.13%
Balashiha, Russia 25.77%
Moscow, Russia 0.17%
Kiev, Ukraine 10.11%
Nikolaev, Ukraine 0.49%
Other Cities 0.33%
SHIPPING-E
Moscow, Russia 91.14%
Krasnodar, Russia 4.36%
Stavropol, Russia 1.45%
Other Cities 3.05%
Table 6: Destinations of the reshipped packages. Moscow and its
suburbs account for a clear majority of the packages final destination
regardless of the reshipping site and the items it targets. At least 85%
of all packages are being reshipped to Moscow.
5.4.2 Label Purchases
Similar to analyzing access patterns to identify suspicious packages,
one can track who purchases package labels and through which chan-
nels. The prepaid labels are being used when the drops mail the package
to the stuffer (see Figure 1,Ð) and, therefore, the corresponding ship-
ments constitute the last chance to intervene before the merchandise
reaches the stuffer and the damage is irreversible. For instance, to iden-
tify a suspicious package, one can analyze the buyer of a package label,
the extent to which a single account pays for multiple different labels
(e.g., “white label” services), or if packages always go to the same desti-
nation but are being shipped by different senders, e.g., by identifying if
a label provider acts as a hub in the scheme. Based on this information,
a risk score can be assigned to each label service who sold the label and
for each individual purchased label. This risk score then captures how
likely it is that the package contains goods paid for through illicit means,
allowing to selectively delay it, and aiding in discovery and recovery.
5.4.3 Reshipping Destinations
The final destinations of the packages that are reshipped are usually
overseas (e.g., in Russia). A stuffer is more likely to use addresses
within a small area for his packages that is under his control so that
he can retrieve it without any issues. Although it is often impossible to
apprehend criminals who are abroad, the patterns of reshipping desti-
nations can help to intercept the international shipping packages before
they leave the country, e.g., at an USPS International Service Center.
To better understand the distribution of the final destination, we use
OCR techniques to extract the recipient addresses in the “To” fields
from the electronic shipping labels (see Figure 2(b)). Table 6 breaks
down the destination cities of the packages. We see a clear trend that the
stuffers ship to Moscow and its suburbs (including Zheleznodorozhnyj
and Balashiha) and we notice that scammers tend to send the packages
to a limited number of addresses and cities, presumably to collect the
packages easily. Focusing inspection efforts on the packages destined
to the stuffers’ prime destination cities can increase the success of
intercepting items from reshipping scams.
6 Related Work
This paper is the first large-scale, in-depth study of reshipping scams.
In this section we first analyze previous research on related topics,
such as “money mules” (for money laundering) and mule recruiting in
general. Then we briefly describe previous research that studied other
parts of criminal operations.
6.1 Mule Studies
A first report on reshipping scams was published by the US Postal
Service in 2004 [8]. The report describes a scheme in which people
were recruited online to receive packages containing goods purchased
with stolen credit cards at their homes and sending them to a postal box
where the cybercriminal could collect them. The analysis performed in
this paper shows that this scheme has considerably evolved over the last
years, and that it is now controlled by well-organized criminal groups.
A wealth of research studied the means of cybercriminals to recruit
mules, and analyzed their demographics. Goett examined the recruit-
ment of money mules via online job boards [15] by collecting 126 email
alerts from two job aggregators, and discovering 177 mule posts on 80
different job boards during seven weeks. Goett’s main findings include
that scammers tend to post jobs under multiple company names, use a
chain of mules to launder money, and prefer mules that respond quickly
to requests. Florencio et al. showed that participating in money launder-
ing made mules liable according to the US consumer protections against
fraud [16], and resulted in mules losing money. The study also sug-
gested that the mule recruitment is the bottleneck in online fraud. In this
paper, we shed light on various components of reshipping scams, pro-
viding the research community with useful insights on this increasingly
popular monetization method for compromised payment instruments.
Moore et al. analyzed websites used to recruit mules on the Internet
and discovered that such sites show the tendency of staying online
for long periods of time even after they have been reported to Internet
Service Providers and law enforcement [17]. Aston et al. examined the
age, gender, and ZIP code of 660 confirmed money mule cases during
2007, gathered by a major Australian financial institution [18]. Their re-
sults showed that mule recruitment trended toward males between ages
25–34. Jones et al. conducted a 75-day analysis about the monetization
methods used by Nigerian scammers by creating 56 honeypot Craigslist
ads [19] and interacting with the scammers that contacted them. The
authors find that victimized sellers can, among others, become money
mules, by caching fake checks sent to them as compensation for their
sold products, and wiring a portion of the money to scammers.
6.2 Cybercrime Studies
The reshipping scam schemes exposed in this paper are a popular
method used by cybercriminals to monetize stolen credit cards and are
therefore often used in conjunction with other fraud and information-
stealing schemes. In 2009, Stone-Gross et al. hijacked Torpig, an
information stealing botnet, and performed a detailed study of the
stolen data type and bot population [5]. Among other types of data,
the Torpig botnet specialized in stealing credit card information from
infected computers. Reshipping scams could potentially have been
employed by the cybercriminals to monetize the stolen credit cards.
A wealth of work has been conducted on analyzing cybercriminal op-
erations involving email spam and the underground economy surround-
ing it. Levchenko et al. [20] analyzed the monetization of spamming
botnets, and, in particular, studied the spam-advertised pharmaceutical,
software, and replica affiliate programs. Other studies analyzed the co-
ordination of spamming botnets and estimated the illicit profit of cyber-
criminals [21–25]. Stringhini et al. developed a methodology to track
the different actors involved in spam operations, and analyzed the rela-
tionships between these actors [26]. Kanich et al. infiltrated the Storm
botnet and measured the conversion rate of spam [21]. McCoy et al. an-
alyzed customer demand and operation overheads of spam campaigns
by using transaction logs of pharmaceutical affiliate programs [27]. Our
work complements previous research by providing insights in a mon-
etization scheme that had, so far, evaded the attention of researchers.
Other research has examined how cybercriminals recruit workers
for various illicit operations [28, 29]. Meiklejohn et al. studied the
anonymity of bitcoin users [30]. Bitcoin and other digital currencies are
another method that cybercriminals use to launder the money , which
can be used instead of the reshipping schemes described in this paper.
Note, however, that attackers cannot account for the unpredictability
of the value of digital currencies thus, we argue that, monetization
through reshipping scams is more profitable for attackers and thus,
more likely to be chosen over alternative monetization schemes.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented the first in-depth and large-scale study
of reshipping as a service, a prominent way that cybercriminals use
to monetize stolen credit cards and other financial instruments. We
have shown that criminals operate reshipping scams in different ways,
target different goods to be shipped through them, provide different
levels of service and guarantees, charge different fees, and split profits
differently. Yet, our results also highlight similarities between different
reshipping scams when it comes to drop recruiting, management,
and churn. That is, the scam operators advertise work-from-home
and part-time jobs for recruitment and abandon mules by ceasing all
communications shortly before the mules should be paid.
Furthermore, we have shown that a single criminal-operated re-
shipping service (SHIPPING-C) can earn a yearly revenue of over
7.3 million US dollars, most of which is profit. Additionally, based on
our analysis, we can estimate that nearly 1.7 million stolen credit cards
are fraudulently charged as part of reshipping scams each year. These
stolen credit cards, in turn, result in an estimated overall revenue for
criminal-operated reshipping scams of 1.8 billion US dollars, and are
possibly responsible for damages up to the same amount to merchants,
credit card holders, banks, and insurers. Finally, we proposed various
techniques that can be leveraged to disrupt the operation of reshipping
scams by identifying, and selectively delaying or stopping packages
containing repackaged merchandise that was purchased with stolen
credit cards.
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